Winter War
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Winter War | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of World War II | |||||||||
 Finnish machine gun team during Winter War. | |||||||||
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| Combatants | |||||||||
.svg-1.png) Finland |  Soviet Union | ||||||||
| Commanders | |||||||||
| Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim | Kliment Voroshilov, later Semyon Timoshenko | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| 250,000 men 30 tanks 130 aircraft[1][2] | 1,000,000 men 3,000 tanks 3,800 aircraft[3][4] | ||||||||
| Casualties | |||||||||
| 26,662 dead 39,886 wounded 1,000 captured[5] | 126,875 dead or missing 264,908 wounded 3,100 captured[6] | ||||||||
| Winter War |
|---|
| Tolvajärvi – Suomussalmi – Taipale – Summa – Raate-Road – Kuhmo – Honkaniemi – Kollaa – Salla – Petsamo |
The Winter War (Finnish: Talvisota, Swedish: Vinterkriget, Russian: Зимняя война, also known as the Soviet-Finnish War or the Russo-Finnish War[7]) broke out when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939, three months after the start of World War II. Because the attack was judged completely illegal, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations on December 14. Soviet leader Josef Stalin had expected to conquer the whole country by the end of 1939, but Finnish resistance frustrated the Soviet forces, who outnumbered the Finns 4:1 in men, 100:1 in tanks and 30:1 in aircraft[3]. Finland held out until March 1940, when a peace treaty was signed ceding about 10% of Finland's territory and 20% of its industrial capacity to the Soviet Union.
The results of the war were mixed. Although the Soviet forces finally managed to break through the Finnish defence, neither the Soviet Union nor Finland emerged from the conflict unscathed. Soviet losses on the front were tremendous, and the country's international standing suffered. Even worse, the fighting ability of the Red Army was put into question, a fact that some argue contributed to Hitler's decision to launch Operation Barbarossa. Finally, the Soviet forces did not accomplish their primary objective of conquest of Finland, but gained only a secession of territory along Lake Ladoga. The Finns retained their sovereignty and gained considerable international goodwill.
The March 15 peace treaty thwarted Franco-British preparations to send support to Finland through northern Scandinavia (the Allied campaign in Norway) which would also have hindered German access to northern Sweden's iron ore. Germany's invasion of Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940 (Operation Weserübung) then diverted the attention of the world to the struggle for possession of Norway. The Winter War is considered by some a military disaster for the Soviet Union. However, Stalin did learn from this fiasco and realized that political control over the Red Army was no longer feasible. After the Winter War, the Kremlin initiated the process of reinstating qualified officers and modernizing its forces, a crucial decision that would enable the Soviets to eventually resist the German invasion. It may be noted that even the German Wehrmacht, as would become apparent in 1941, was not prepared for offensive winter warfare. Likewise, the Battle of the Bulge at the end of 1944 saw thousands of American troops stranded by weather arguably mild compared to Nordic winter.
History
Pre-World War I
Finland had long been part of the Swedish kingdom when it was conquered by Russia in 1809 and turned into an autonomous buffer state to protect the Russian capital.
Western Karelia had a different history from the rest of Finland. Most of the area paid tribute to the Russian Novgorod feudal republic and was the arena of Swedish-Novgorodian Wars. The southwestern area, from the River Sestra to the River Vuoksi and Lake Saimaa (including Viborg) was annexed by Sweden at the same time as the rest of Finland, and the border was defined between Sweden and Novgorod at the Treaty of Nöteborg in 1323. In 1617, the rest of the Western Karelia was captured by Sweden. During the Swedish sovereignty this region lost all of its Russian ecclesiastical and bourgeois inhabitants and many of its Russian Orthodox Karelian population, with much of it moving to the Tver region. In 1721, as a result of Northern War, the Karelian isthmus, the Ladoga Karelia, and later in 1743 the Southern Karelia, was captured by Russia. Almost a century later in 1812 Russian emperor Alexander incorporated this region into the Grand Duchy of Finland.
World War I era
Following the October Revolution that brought the Communists to power in Russia, Finland was offered independence. Finland declared itself independent on December 6, 1917. Strong ties between Finland and Germany began when Imperial Germany supported Finland's underground independence movement during the First World War. In the subsequent Finnish Civil War, German-trained Finnish Jäger troops and regular German troops played a crucial role. Only Germany's defeat in World War I hindered the establishment of a Germany-dependent monarchy under Frederick Charles of Hesse as King of Finland. Following the war, German–Finnish ties remained close, although Finnish sympathy for the National Socialists was very sparse.
Lead-up to World War II
The relationship between the Soviet Union and Finland had been tense and frosty—the two periods of forced Russification at the turn of the century, and the legacy of the failed socialist rebellion in Finland contributed to a strong mutual distrust. Stalin feared that Nazi Germany would eventually attack, and with the Soviet-Finnish border crossing the Karelian isthmus just 32 km away from Leningrad, Finnish territory would have provided an excellent base for the attack. In 1932, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Finland. The agreement was reaffirmed in 1934 for ten years. However, the Soviet Union violated the Treaty of Tartu in 1937 by blockading Finnish merchant ships navigating between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland.
Russian-Finnish-German relations
In April 1938 or possibly even earlier, the Soviet Union began diplomatic negotiations with Finland, trying to improve their mutual defence against Germany. The Soviets were mainly concerned that Germany would use Finland as a bridgehead for an attack on Leningrad, and demanded concessions of large areas. More than a year passed without considerable progress and the political situation in Europe worsened.
Nazi Germany signs non-aggression pact with Soviets
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union signed a mutual non-aggression pact, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, on August 23, 1939. The pact also included a secret clause allocating the countries of Eastern Europe between the two signatories. Finland was consigned to the Soviet "sphere of influence". The German attack on Poland on September 1, was followed by a Soviet invasion from the east. Within a few weeks, they had divided the country between them.
Soviet Union tests Finland's resolve
In autumn 1939, after Germany's attack on Poland, the Soviet Union finally demanded that Finland agree to move the border 25 kilometres back from Leningrad, which was at that time only 32 kilometres from Finland. It also demanded that Finland lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for 30 years for the creation of a naval base there. In exchange, the Soviet Union offered Finland a large part of Karelia ("two pounds of dirt for one pound of gold"). In empathic retrospect, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen stated in September 1963,
"When now, after more than 20 years, we put ourselves in the position of the Soviet Union, then in light of Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the concern that the USSR had, and should have had, in relation to its safety at the end of the 1930s becomes understandable."
Mainila incident spurs war
The Finnish government refused the Soviet demands. The Soviet General Staff under Boris Shaposhnikov and Alexander Vasilevsky was already drawing up plans for an offensive. On November 26, the Soviets staged the Shelling of Mainila, an incident in which Soviet artillery shelled areas near the Russian village of Mainila, then announced that a Finnish artillery attack had killed Soviet troops.[8] The Soviet Union demanded that Finns apologise for the incident and move their forces 20-25 km from the border. The Finns denied any responsibility for the attack and refused to give in. The Soviet Union used it as an excuse to withdraw from the non-aggression pact. On November 30, Soviet forces attacked with 23 divisions, totalling 450,000 men, which quickly reached the Mannerheim Line.
The Terijoki Government, a Soviet puppet regime created in the occupied Finnish border town of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk) on December 1, 1939, was also called the Finnish Democratic Republic. It was headed by Otto Ville Kuusinen and was used for both diplomatic purposes (it was immediately recognized by the Soviet Union) and for military ones (they hoped it would encourage socialists in Finland's Army to defect). This republic was not particularly successful, but lasted until March 12, 1940 and was eventually incorporated into the Russian Karelo-Finnish SSR.
Hostilities
Initially, Finland had a mobilized army of only 180,000 men, but these troops turned out to be fierce adversaries employing small-unit surrounding "motti" tactics, fast-moving ski troops in white camouflage suits, and local knowledge. Many had spent most of their lives in the forest, as the vast majority of Finns were rural dwellers until the 1950s. The conditions of the winter of 1939/40 were harsh; temperatures of -40°C were not unusual, and the Finns were able to use this to their advantage. Often, they wisely opted not to engage the enemy in conventional warfare, instead targeting field kitchens (which were crucial for survival in the cold weather) and picking off Soviet troops huddled around camp fires.
At the beginning of the war, only those Finnish soldiers who had received basic training had uniforms and weapons. The rest had to make do with their own clothing, which was their normal winter clothing in many instances, with a semblance of an insignia added. These mismatched "uniforms" were nicknamed "Model Cajander" after the Prime Minister Aimo Cajander. The Finns alleviated their shortages by making extensive use of equipment, weapons and ammunition captured from the enemy. Fortunately, the army had not changed the calibre of its weapons after independence and was able to use Soviet ammunition. Sending out poorly trained and badly led Soviet troops played right into the hands of the Finns, allowing the latter ample opportunities to capture war booty. Though the Finns had few anti-tank weaponry, they had the Molotov cocktail, an improvised petrol bomb adapted from the Spanish Civil War, which was used with great success in destroying around 2000 Soviet Tanks.
The Soviets attacked in regimental strength, with their dark uniforms easily visible against the white snow, so they were easily picked off by the Finns' snipers and machine guns. Corporal Simo Häyhä was credited with more than 500 known kills. When the Red Army tried to use their own snipers, the Finns countered with the "Kylmä-Kalle" (Cold Charlie) tactic. A mannequin or other doll was dressed as a tempting target, such as an officer sloppily covering himself. Soviet snipers usually were unable to resist the target. Once the Finns determined the angle from whence came the shot, a heavy-calibre gun, such as a "Norsupyssy" ("Elephant rifle") anti-tank rifle, was fired in the Soviet sniper's direction to kill him.
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Soviet arrogance and incompetence were important factors in the Finnish success during the war. The attackers were not expecting much resistance; General Kirill Meretskov estimated it would take only 10 to 12 days for his 26 well equipped 14,000 man divisions to reach Helsinki. Their propaganda had been so convincing that it was felt that the Finns would be waving flags and welcoming the Red Army with open arms. Historical accounts abound of Russian soldiers advancing towards Finnish lines arm-in-arm, voices joined in rousing Soviet anthems.
Due to Stalin's purges, the commanders of the Red Army had suffered 80 per cent peacetime losses[citation needed]. These were commonly replaced by people less competent but more "loyal" to their superiors, since Stalin had supervised his commanders with Commissar or political officers. Tactics which were obsolete by World War I were sometimes employed. Tactics were strictly "by the book," as failed initiative carried a high risk of execution for its leadership. Many Soviet troops were lost simply due to their commander refusing to retreat; commissars disallowed them from doing so and often executed commanders that disobeyed.
The Soviet army was poorly prepared for winter warfare, particularly in forests, and heavily used vulnerable motorized vehicles. These vehicles were kept running 24 hours a day so their fuel would not freeze, but still there were reports of engines breaking down and fuel shortages. One of the most remarkable losses in military history is the so-called "Raatteentie Incident," during the month-long Battle of Suomussalmi. The Soviet 44th Infantry Division (ca 25,000 troops) was almost completely destroyed after marching on a forest road straight into an ambush of the Finnish "Kontula detachment" (a unit of 300 men). This small unit blocked the advance of the Soviet Division, while Finnish colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo and his 9th Division (ca 6,000 troops) cut off the Soviet retreat route, divided the enemy force into smaller units and then destroyed it in detail. The Soviet casualties amounted to up to 23,000 men, while the Finnish lost around 800 men. In addition, the Finnish troops captured 43 tanks, 71 field and anti-aircraft cannons, 29 anti-tank cannons, AFVs, tractors, 260 trucks, 1170 horses, infantry weapons, ammunition, medical and communication material as war booty.
The Soviets failed to take advantage of their numerical superiority at the start of the war. Finland massed 130,000 men and 500 guns in the Karelian isthmus, the main theater of the war; the Soviets attacked with only 200,000 men and 900 guns. 1,000 tanks were poorly utilized and took massive losses.
Aerial
The air war during the Winter War saw Finland use the "finger four" formation style of air combat (four planes, split into two units of two planes, one unit flying low and the other high, with each plane fighting independently of the others yet supporting their wingman in combat), which was superior to the Russian tactic of three fighters flying in a delta formation. This formation and the credo of Finnish pilots to always attack, no matter the odds, contributed to the failure of Russian bombers to inflict substantial damage against Finnish positions, cities or population reserves.
Other Considerations
Due to Stalin's ethnic paranoia, the vast bulk of the Red Army's troops that fought in the Winter War were taken from the southern regions of the Soviet Union. It was Stalin's opinion that Soviet troops from the area immediately bordering Finland could not be trusted to fight against the Finns. These southern Red Army soldiers had absolutely no experience with Arctic winter conditions and virtually no forest survival skills, let alone fighting skills. Not only were they up against the Finns who were experts in winter warfare and knew the land, the weather during the war was one of the three worst winters recorded in Finland.
To the surprise of both the Soviets and the Finns, it turned out that the majority of the Finnish Socialists did not support the Soviet invasion but fought alongside their compatriots against the common enemy. Many Finnish Communists had moved to the Soviet Union in the 1930s to "build Socialism," only to end up as victims of Stalin's Great Purges, which led to widespread disillusionment and even open hatred of the Soviet regime among Socialists in Finland.
Another factor was the advancement of Finnish society and laws after the civil war that helped to decrease the gap between different classes of society. This partial healing of the wounds and rifts after the Finnish Civil War (1918), and Finland's language strife. The coming together of different factions of society is still referred to as "the Spirit of the Winter War". The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany had shaken the world views of both the bourgeois as well as the working class Finns. Many Finns had believed that Germany would eventually aid Finland against the Soviet Union as Imperial Germany had in 1918. In similar fashion the ordinary workers had believed that Soviet Union was a guarantee for peace and force against Nazi Germany. Now, suddenly Germany was in pact with Soviet Union against Finland. The workers had witnessed the Soviet Union invading Poland instead of fighting the Nazis. On the eve of war there was very little trust for any foreign power -- be it socialist internationalism, German military, League of Nations or western powers. Nonetheless, some communists were not allowed to fight in Finland's conscripted army because of their political background.
Foreign support
World opinion at large supported the Finnish cause. The World War had not yet begun in earnest and was known to the public as the Phony War; at that time, the Winter War was the only real fighting besides the German and Soviet invasion of Poland, and thus held major world interest. The Soviet aggression was generally deemed totally unjustified. Various foreign organizations sent material aid, such as medical supplies. Finnish immigrants in the United States and Canada returned home, and many volunteers (one of them actor-to-be Christopher Lee) travelled to Finland to join Finland's forces: 1,010 Danes, 895 Norwegians, 372 Ingrians, 346 Finnish expatriates, 346 Hungarians[9] and 210 volunteers of other nationalities made it to Finland before the war was over. Foreign correspondents in Helsinki wrote, and even greatly exaggerated, reports of supposed Finnish ingenuity and successes in combat.
Sweden
Sweden, which had declared itself to be a non-belligerent rather than a neutral country (as in the war between Nazi Germany and the Western Powers) contributed military supplies, cash, credits, humanitarian aid and some 8,700 Swedish volunteers prepared to fight for Finland. Perhaps most significant was the Swedish Voluntary Air Force, in action from January 7, with 12 fighters, 5 bombers, and 8 other planes, amounting to a third of the Swedish Air Force of that time. Volunteer pilots and mechanics were drawn from the ranks. The renowned aviator Count Carl Gustav von Rosen, related to Hermann Göring, volunteered independently. There was also a volunteer work force, of about 900 workers and engineers.
The Swedish Volunteer Corps with 8,402 men in Finland — the only common volunteers who had finished training before the war ended — began relieving five Finnish battalions at Märkäjärvi in mid-February. Together with three remaining Finnish battalions, the corps faced two Soviet divisions and were preparing for an attack by mid-March, but were inhibited by the peace agreement. 33 men died in action, among them the commander of the first relieving unit, Lieutenant Colonel Magnus Dyrssen.
The Swedish volunteers remain a source of dissonance between Swedes and Finns. The domestic debate in Finland had in the years immediately before the war given common Finns hope of considerably more support from Sweden, such as a large force of regular troops, that could have had a significant impact on the outcome of the war — or possibly caused the Russians not to attack at all.
However the help from volunteers, especially the Scandinavian ones, was appreciated by the Finns. This is shown by the fact that during the Norwegian campaign against the German invasion in April 1940 a Finnish group of volunteers formed an ambulance unit and helped the defenders until forced to return home because of the rapid success of the German armed forces.
Franco-British plans for a Scandinavian theatre
Within a month, the Soviet leadership began to consider abandoning the operation and Finland's government was approached with preliminary peace feelers (via Sweden's government), first on January 29. Until then, Finland had fought for its existence as an independent and democratic country. When credible rumours of this reached the governments in Paris and London, the incentives for military support were dramatically changed. Now Finland fought "only" to keep as much as possible of its territory that lay near Leningrad. To maintain public opinion, though, none of this information was publicized — neither in Finland, nor abroad. Finland's fight remained considered a life and death struggle.
(Borders as of 1920–1940.)
In February 1940, the Allies offered to help: the Allied plan, approved on February 5 by the Allied High Command, consisted of 100,000 British and 35,000 French troops that were to disembark at the Norwegian port of Narvik and support Finland via Sweden while securing the supply routes along the way. The plan was agreed to be launched on March 20 under the condition that the Finns plead for help. On March 2, transit rights were officially requested from the governments of Norway and Sweden. It was hoped this would eventually bring the two still neutral Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden, to the Allied side by strengthening their positions against Germany — although Hitler had, by December declared to the Swedish government that Western troops on Swedish soil would immediately provoke a German invasion, which in practice meant that Nazi Germany would take the populated southern part of Scandinavia while France and Britain would fight in the furthest North.
However, only a small fraction of the Western troops were intended for Finland. Proposals to enter Finland directly, via the ice-free harbour of Petsamo, had been dismissed. There were suspicions that the objective of the operation was to capture and occupy the Norwegian shipping harbour of Narvik and the vast mountainous areas of the North-Swedish iron ore fields, from which the Third Reich received a large share of its iron ore, critical to war production. If Franco-British troops moved to halt export to Germany, the area could become a battleground for the armies of the Allies and the Third Reich. As a consequence, Norway and Sweden denied transit. Only after the war did it become known that the commander of the Allied expedition force was actually instructed to avoid combat contact with the Soviet troops.
The Franco-British plan initially hoped to capture all of Scandinavia north of a line Stockholm–Göteborg or Stockholm–Oslo, i.e. the British concept of the Lake line following the lakes of Mälaren, Hjälmaren, and Vänern, which would contribute with good natural defence some 1,700–1,900 kilometres south for Narvik. The expected frontier, the Lake line, involved not only Sweden's two largest cities, but its consequence was that the homes of the vast majority of the Swedes would be either Nazi-occupied or in the war zone. Later, the ambition was lowered to only the northern half of Sweden and the rather narrow adjacent Norwegian coast.
The Swedish government, headed by Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson, declined to allow transit of armed troops through Swedish territory. Although Sweden had not declared itself neutral in the Winter War, it was neutral in the war involving France, Britain, and Germany. Granting transit rights to a Franco-British corps was at that time considered too great a departure from international laws on neutrality.
The Swedish Cabinet also decided to reject repeated pleas from the Finns for regular Swedish troops to be deployed in Finland, and in the end the Swedes also made it clear that their support in arms and munitions could not be maintained for much longer. Diplomatically, Finland was squeezed between Allied hopes for a prolonged war and Scandinavian fears of a continued war spreading to neighbouring countries (or of the surge of refugees that might result from a Finnish defeat). Also, Hermann Göring was through his private channels in Sweden offering distinct advice for peace and concessions — Göring suggested that concessions "could always later be mended."
While Berlin and Stockholm pressured Helsinki to accept peace on bad conditions, Paris and London had the opposite objective. From time to time, different plans and figures were presented for the Finns. To start with, France and Britain promised to send 20,000 men to arrive by the end of February, although under the implicit condition that on their way to Finland they were given opportunity to occupy North-Scandinavia.
By the end of February, Finland's Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Mannerheim, was pessimistic about the military situation. Therefore, on February 29 the government decided to start peace negotiations. That same day, the Soviets commenced an attack against Viipuri.
When France and Britain realized that Finland was seriously considering a peace treaty, they gave a new offer for help: 50,000 men were to be sent, if Finland asked for help before March 12. Only 6,000 of these would have actually been destined for Finland. The rest were intended to secure harbours, roads and iron ore fields on the way.
Despite the feeble forces that would have reached Finland, intelligence about the plans reached the Soviet Union and contributed heavily to their decision to sign the armistice ending the war. It is argued that without the threat of Allied intervention, nothing would have eventually stopped the Soviets from conquering all of Finland by sheer mass and seemingly endless reserve troops.
Armistice
By the end of the winter, it became clear that the Russian forces were becoming exhausted, and German representatives suggested that Finland should negotiate with the Soviet Union. Russian casualties had been high and the situation was a source of political embarrassment for the Soviet regime. With the spring thaw approaching, the Russian forces risked becoming bogged down in the forests, and a draft of peace terms was presented to Finland on February 12. Not only the Germans but also the Swedes were keen to see an end to the Winter War, as the latter feared the collapse of its neighbor. As Finland's Cabinet hesitated in face of the harsh Soviet conditions, Sweden's King Gustaf V made a public statement, in which he confirmed having declined Finnish pleas for support from Swedish troops.
By the end of February, the Finns had depleted their ammunition supplies. Also, the Soviet Union had finally succeeded in breaking through the Mannerheim Line. Finally, on February 29, the Finnish government agreed to start negotiations. By March 5, the Soviet army had advanced 10–15 kilometres past the Mannerheim Line and had entered the suburbs of Viipuri. The Finns proposed an armistice on the same day, but the Soviets wanted to keep the pressure on and declined the offer the next day. Indeed, the fighting continued up to the day the peace treaty was signed.
After the war, the situation of the Finnish army at Karelian Isthmus at the end of the war had created significant discussion. The orders were already given to prepare a retreat to the next line of defence in the Taipale sector. The estimates of how long the enemy could have been held in these kinds of retreat-and-stand operations varied from a few days[10] to a couple of months[11], most averaging around a few weeks[12], too little time for any foreign help to make a difference.
It is speculated that Stalin had practically wiped out his intelligence apparatus during the purges, thus damaging the effectiveness of spies in Finland and other countries, as well as cowing operatives into writing the kind of reports they thought Stalin wanted to read. Thus he was not aware the real situation in Finland and amongst the Western Allies[13][14].
Soviet intelligence sources were informing their leadership of the Allied plans to intervene in the war, but not of the details or the actual unpreparedness of the Allies. Therefore, the Soviets felt forced to seek a premature end to the war before the Allies intervened and declared war on the Soviet Union.
During four months of fighting, the Soviet Army suffered huge losses. One Red Army General remarked that "we have won enough ground to bury our dead." Casualty estimates vary widely — from 48,000 killed, died from wounds, and missing in action, as quoted by Soviet officials immediately after the war, to 391,800 according to some recent research[15] According to Nikita Khrushchev, 1.5 million men were sent to Finland and one million of them were killed, while 1000 aircraft, 2300 tanks and armored cars and an enormous amount of other war materials were lost. [4] The most reliable current estimate puts the figure at 126,875[6]. Finland's losses were limited to around 22,830 men[16].
Peace of Moscow
In the Moscow Peace Treaty of March 12, Finland was forced to cede the Finnish part of Karelia. The land included the city of Viipuri (the country's second largest), much of Finland's industrialized territory, and significant parts still held by Finland's army: nearly 10 per cent of prewar Finland. Some 422,000 Karelians, 12 per cent of Finland's population, lost their homes. Military troops and remaining civilians were hastily evacuated in accordance with the terms of the treaty, as only a few score civilians chose to remain under Soviet governance.
Finland also had to cede a part of the Salla area, the Kalastajansaarento peninsula in the Barents Sea and four islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Hanko Peninsula was also leased to the Soviet Union as a military base for 30 years. While the Soviet troops had captured Petsamo during the war, they returned it to Finland according to the treaty.
As a whole, the peace terms were harsh for Finland. The USSR received the city of Vyborg, in addition to their prewar demands. Sympathy from the League of Nations, Western Allies, and from the Swedes in particular, did not prove to be of much help.
Only a year later, hostilities were resumed in the Continuation War.
The 25000 widows, eldest daughters or mothers of the Fallen Finnish soldiers were given the mourning-cross of the Order of the Liberty Cross. The next of kin of the civilian casualties were given a medal on a black ribbon.
Post-Soviet demands for return of territory
After the war, Karelian local governments, parishes and provincial organizations established Karjalan Liitto in order to defend the rights and interests of Karelian evacuees and to find a solution for returning Karelia. During the Cold War, President Urho Kekkonen tried several times to get the territories back by negotiating with the Soviet leadership, but did not succeed. No one openly demanded return. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, disputes were revived. Some minor groups in Finland have been actively demanding the peaceful return to Finland of the ceded territories. The most active group in this field is ProKarelia. In the latest polls, these demands have met with 26 per cent – 38 per cent support in Finland.[17] Although the peaceful return of Karelia has always been on its agenda, Karjalan Liitto has, for the most part, stayed away from these demands.
Major battles
- Battle of Suomussalmi, (December 8, 1939 - January 7, 1940)
- Battle of Raate-Road, (January 1, 1940 - January 7, 1940)
- Battle of Tolvajärvi, (December 12, 1939)
- Battle of Honkaniemi, (February 26, 1940)
- Battle of Kollaa, (December 7 - March 13, 1940)
Winter War in popular culture
In 1989, the Finnish movie Talvisota was released. This film tells the story of a Finnish platoon of reservists from Kauhava. The platoon belongs to the infantry regiment "Jr23", which consists almost solely of men from Southern Ostrobothnia.
The Finnish black metal band Impaled Nazarene recorded the song "Total War - Winter War" in reference to the fighting.
Notes
- ^ Pentti Virrankoski, Suomen Historia 2, 2001, ISBN 951-746-342-1, SKS
- ^ Erkki Käkelä, Laguksen miehet, marskin nyrkki: Suomalainen panssariyhtymä 1941-1944, 1992, ISBN 952-90-3858-5, Panssarikilta
- ^ a b Tomas Ries, Cold Will - The Defense of Finland, 1988, ISBN 0-08-033592-6, Potomac Books
- ^ Ohto Manninen, Talvisodan salatut taustat, 1994, ISBN 952-90-5251-0, Kirjaneuvos, using declassified Soviet archive material, Manninen found 12 previously unrecognized infantry divisions ordered to Finnish front
- ^ Finnish Defence College, Talvisodan historia 4, p.406, 1991, ISBN 951-0-17566-8, WSOY, The dead includes 3,671 badly wounded who died after the war without leaving the hospital, some several years after the war.
- ^ a b G.F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, 1997, ISBN 1-85367-280-7, Greenhill Books
- ^ Russo-Finnish War. Encarta. Retrieved on 2006-07-11.
- ^ Tanner, Väinö, The Winter War, 1957, Stanford University Press
- ^ Tapani Kossila: Foreign volunteers in the Winter War
- ^ Laaksonen, Lasse, Todellisuus ja harhat, 2005, ISBN 951-20-6911-3, Gummerus
- ^ Wolf H. Halsti, Talvisota 1939-1940, 1955, Otava
- ^ Paasikivi, J.K., Toimintani Moskovassa, 1959, WSOY
- ^ C. Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939–40, 1997, London: Frank Cass
- ^ Rentola, Kimmo, Residenttimme ilmoittaa..., Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 2002
- ^ A.E.Taras, Soviet-Finland 1939-1940 war, Minsk, 1999.
- ^ Winter War Website, [1]
- ^ Karjala-lehti and MC-Info Oy 2005 (36 % vs. 52 %), Karjalan Liitto and Taloustutkimus 5.- 7.4. 2005 (26 % vs. 57 %)[2], HS-Gallup: Selvä enemmistö ei halua Karjalaa takaisin 21.8.2005 (30 % vs. 62 %)[3], STT / Suomen Gallup 2.7. 2004 (38 % vs. 57 %)
Bibliography
- Engle, Eloise; Paananen, Lauri (1992). The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940. Stackpole Books. ISBN 0-8117-2433-6.
- Ries, Tomas (1988). Cold Will: Defence of Finland. Brassey's. ISBN 0-08-033592-6.
- Trotter, William R (1991). A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940 (also published as The Winter War). Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill. ISBN 1-56512-249-6.
- Van Dyke, Carl (1997). The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939-40. Frank Cass Publishers. ISBN 0-7146-4314-9.
冬季战争
冬季战争（也称为苏芬战争），于1939年11月30日爆发，也就是欧洲第二次世界大战爆发后三个月。当时苏联军队入侵芬兰，苏联并于同年12月14日应芬兰要求被国联开除，斯大林希望在1939年结束战斗，但由于芬兰的抵抗，直到1940年3月才签署停战协定，芬兰将10%的国土划给苏联。
这场战争中双方皆有损失，芬兰丧失了拉多加湖周围的土地，苏联为列宁格勒周围获得了一块缓冲地带，但丧失了国际舆论支持，并暴露了红军作战能力的缺陷，而为后来希特勒发动进攻苏联的战争增加了信心。
3月15日的苏芬和平协议阻止了英法联盟通过挪威向芬兰提供援助，也刺激了纳粹德国于当年4月9日进攻丹麦和挪威。
苏联红军在冬季战争中的表现，使斯大林领悟到运用政治手段控制军队无法加强军队的战斗力，战争过后，红军重新起用有能力的军事指挥官，并加强军队现代化。对后来抵抗纳粹德国起了很大的作用。
背景
芬兰在1808年被沙皇俄国征服，成为俄国的属国，在第一次世界大战中，德国作为俄国的对立面一直鼓励芬兰要求独立的斗争，俄国十月革命后，芬兰政府立即于1917年12月6日宣布独立，但由于德国战败，德国扶持的黑森亲王弗里德里希·卡尔没有能成为芬兰国王，但德国和芬兰的关系一直很紧密。
但在争取芬兰独立的过程中，芬兰和俄国以及其后苏联的关系一直很冷淡，苏联支持的芬兰社会主义者起义已经失败，斯大林当时非常担心纳粹德国会进攻苏联，但苏芬边界距离列宁格勒只有32千米，他担心芬兰会成为德国进攻的根据地。1932年苏联和芬兰签署了互不侵犯协定，1934年又进一步确定此协定为十年有效。
1938年4月，苏联和芬兰进行外交谈判，希望和芬兰联合抵抗德国，并希望芬兰将列宁格勒外围领土和苏联北方领土交换，以达到保护列宁格勒的目的。但谈判延续长达一年也没有实质性结果，这时欧洲的形势已经开始恶化。
1939年8月23日，苏联和纳粹德国签定互不侵犯条约，条约中包括一项秘密条款，在两国之间的东欧国家中划分势力范围，其中将芬兰划归苏联。9月1日德国进攻波兰，苏联随后也在东面出兵，仅几个星期，两国瓜分了波兰。
当年秋季，苏联要求芬兰将边界从列宁格勒后退25千米，并租界汉科半岛30年，以建设海军基地，苏联割让两倍的卡累利阿领土给芬兰作为交换，。1963年芬兰总统曾经说：“20年后的现在，如果我们站在苏联的立场，处于1941年希特勒侵略的危险中，1930年代末苏联一定会为自己的安全着想，这是可以理解的。”
但是当时芬兰政府拒绝了苏联的提议，苏联军队制造了“曼尼拉事件”，宣称芬兰军队炮击曼尼拉村造成苏联士兵的死亡，进而要求芬兰政府赔礼道歉，并将军队后撤20到25公里，但被芬兰政府拒绝。苏联以此为借口废除苏芬互不侵犯条约，11月30日，23个师共45万军队攻入芬兰边界，迅速抵达曼诺海姆防线。
1939年12月1日，苏联扶持建立了一个傀儡政权，叫做芬兰民主共和国，希望藉此煽动芬兰军队中的社会主义者反叛，但没有成功，这个共和国只存在到1940年3月12日，后来并入到苏联卡累利阿加盟共和国中去了。
战争
芬兰的机动部队当时只有18万人，但实行游击战，芬兰的滑雪部队身披白色伪装服可以在雪地中迅速运动，并使用在西班牙内战中发明的石油炸弹。当年冬天温度低达-40℃，芬兰部队经常进攻苏联军队的食堂和篝火旁，游击战取得很大的成功。
虽然芬兰的社会主义者因为其信仰不允许进入正式部队，但令芬兰和苏联的领导人都感到惊奇的是芬兰绝大部分社会主义者并没有和苏联站到一起，反而和他们的同胞一起战斗。这主要是由于有部分芬兰共产党人到苏联后，反而被斯大林的“大清洗”所镇压，引起对苏联的不信任感。另外还因为芬兰经过1918年的内战后，社会阶级差别缩小，社会矛盾减弱。
苏联军官的傲慢和不能胜任也是战争发展的重要因素，当时苏联认为很快就能取得胜利，据历史记载当时苏联军队甚至手挽手唱着国歌向芬兰战线挺进。在大清洗中，苏联军官有80%被撤换，新上来的都是忠于斯大林而不懂指挥战争的，斯大林用政委监督军事长官，只是按照书本指挥战斗，苏联军队许多败仗都是由于指挥不当造成的。
苏联军 队也没有准备冬季在森林中战斗的装备，大量使用战斗车辆，这些车辆必须24小时不熄火才能保证油料不会冻住。苏联第44步兵师（约2万5千人）进入森林后 被芬兰第9师（约6千人）分割包围歼灭，造成大约2万3千人战死，而芬兰方面只损失约8百人，并缴获43辆坦克，71架高射炮，29门反坦克炮，260辆 卡车和1170匹马以及许多轻武器和给养。
也由于苏联决策人员的傲慢无知，没能在战争开始时就投入决定性力量：芬兰在主要战场上集中了13万人和500门炮，而苏联只投入了20万人和900门炮，虽然有1千辆坦克，但没有好好运用，反而损失惨重。
因为芬兰的装备不足，在开始时只有受到最基本的训练的士兵有军服和枪支，其他参战人员只能自己在衣服上佩带标志，所以尽量使用俘获的武器。由于苏联军队一开始领导不力，训练不足，大量武器落入芬兰人手中。
由于斯大林的种族偏见，参加冬季战争的苏联军队主要是由南方的部队组成，他不信任当时在苏芬边界的部队，怕他们可能和芬兰人有亲戚关系或共同的文化历史，但南方的部队不适应芬兰的冬季寒冷和森林中的战斗。在1950年代，绝大部分芬兰人还生活在农村，他们自己的御寒衣物已经足可以使他们在严冬中战斗，当年的冬季是芬兰历史上有记录的最寒冷的三个冬天之一。
芬兰空军的规模远小于苏联空军，不过他们的训练扎实，要求标准很高，飞行员与其他国家之间的交流很普遍。芬兰空军在这个阶段已经开始使用4机编队做为他们空战的基本编制。这种编队和德国在西班牙内战时期发展出来的战术编组的基本概念是相似的。四架飞机当中以两架为小队进行战斗，通常是由较为资深的飞行员担任小队的长机，在战斗中居于主动的地位，另外一架由较为资浅的飞行员操作，负责掩护和伺机攻击敌机。这种战术编队到了二次世界大战时期也逐渐被各国家采用，并且成为现代战斗机作战编队的基础。
苏联空军当时还是采用沿习自一次世界大战以来的3机编队战术，无论是在飞行员个别的训练、编队间的默契以及作战的企图心上都远不如芬兰，有不少的报告指出3机编队中的僚机有的时候无论有没有目标，都会随著长机开火，形成浪费弹药的情况。负责支援轰炸机的战斗机有的时候还会丢下同伴，脱离作战空域。
较差的训练以及呆板的战术，使得苏联空军虽然数量大于芬兰空军，然而在作战效果上远不如芬兰空军的表现，导致苏联空军损失惨重之外，对芬兰境内目标的轰炸效果也非常有限。
国外支援
由于苏联的行为是明显侵略，引起许多外国团体的不满，送来物资和药品援助芬兰，在美国和加拿大的芬兰移民，有许多回来参加战斗。在战斗期间共有1,010丹麦志愿者、895位挪威志愿者、372英国志愿者、346位芬兰在外国的移民和210来自其他国家的志愿者参加了战斗。还有许多外国记者来芬兰报道。
瑞典当 时还非中立国，只是声称为“不结盟国家”，但也支援芬兰军事物资和现金，有8,700位瑞典志愿者准备到芬兰参加战斗，其中包括一个空军，有12架战斗 机、5架轰炸机和8架后勤飞机，占当时瑞典空军的1/3，他们放弃瑞典军衔，准备到芬兰战斗，还包括900位地勤工人和工程师。
瑞典志愿军有8,402人在2月中旬参加了战斗，33人战死。
英法的作用
直到1940年2月，同盟国才决定援助芬兰，2月5日同盟国考虑3月20日在挪威北部登陆10万英国军队和3万5千法国军队，穿过瑞典进入芬兰，但需要在芬兰政府要求的条件下。3月2日正式向挪威和瑞典政府提出要求，希望将这两个中立国带入同盟国一方。但12月时希特勒已经向瑞典政府照会，如果同盟国军队踏上瑞典国土一步，就意味着德国立即进攻瑞典。
当时瑞典和挪威政府都没有同意同盟国的要求，战后透露的文件证实，其实同盟国根本无意和苏联交火，只是想借此占领挪威北部的铁矿，以阻断德国的战略物资来源。
瑞典拒绝了同盟国军队入境的要求，也拒绝了芬兰希望瑞典正规军参加战斗的要求，同时明确表示不能进一步对芬兰援助了。现在芬兰已经处于两难地步，同盟国希望战争继续拖下去，而瑞典希望尽快结束战争，害怕会殃及池鱼。德国也希望尽快结束战争。
当时各国都在敦促芬兰，英法答应送来20,000人部队，德国和瑞典希望答应和平条件，芬兰军队指挥对战斗发展比较悲观，所以芬兰政府下决心在2月29日开始和平谈判。
听到芬兰开始谈判，英法又答应送来50,000人部队，但实际只有6,000人准备援助芬兰，其余人准备夺取挪威铁矿和港口。这个情报到达苏联决策部门，也促使了和平协议的迅速达成。
停战
到了冬季快结束时，德国敦促芬兰尽快和苏联谈判，苏联也损失惨重，又在国际社会中受到孤立。2月12日芬兰收到和平协议草案，不仅德国，瑞典也希望战争尽早结束以免受到波及，瑞典国王古斯塔夫五世公开宣称不再给予芬兰以军事援助。
到了2月底，芬兰的军事物资几乎消耗殆尽，苏联也已经攻破曼诺海姆防线。2月29日，芬兰政府同意谈判，3月5日，苏联军队又挺进10-15千米，逼近维堡郊区，芬兰政府要求停战，但苏联军队一直到3月12日协定签字才停止军队进攻。
这次战争中苏联红军损失惨重，48,000人阵亡，27万人失踪。芬兰方面22,830人阵亡。芬兰老兵经常夸口说一名芬兰士兵倒下去，要换取10名苏联士兵的生命。此外苏联还丧失了2千辆坦克。红军的将军说在这次战争中“我们仅仅获得了足够埋葬阵亡将士们的土地”。
莫斯科和平协定
根据3月12日莫斯科和平协定，芬兰丧失了卡累利阿，包括芬兰第二大城市维堡，芬兰10%的耕地，1/5的工业产值。22万2千居民，占芬兰总人口12%的人丧失了家园被遣送，只有极少量人口选择留下加入苏联籍。
芬兰还割让了巴伦支海上的里巴奇半岛，芬兰湾中四个岛屿，部分萨拉区域，并将汉科半岛租借给苏联作为海军基地，租借期30年。
这个协议对于芬兰来说是非常严酷的，仅仅过了一年，就又在德国支持下和苏联爆发了持续战争。
‘面包篮’与‘鸡尾酒’
在冬季战争中，有两种武器被冠上了有苏联外交部长莫洛托夫之名的戏称。
苏联空军于开战首日即展开了针对芬兰首都赫尔辛基为首大都市的空袭，其中甚至包括了子母弹形式的燃烧弹，然而，面对芬兰对苏联轰炸行为的指责，莫洛托夫却辩称苏联空军并未轰炸芬兰，而是为都市内饥饿的工人空投“面包”；因此之故，在整个战争期间，芬兰人都将苏联空军的炸弹戏谑的称为“莫洛托夫的面包篮”。
另外，在冬季游击战期间，芬兰军大量使用发明于西班牙内战，以玻璃瓶等容器盛装石油、磷、助燃剂等物的燃烧瓶，对苏军阵地与车辆造成极大损害，由于多以酒瓶为容器，故有芬兰官兵将之称为“这是给莫洛托夫的鸡尾酒”，于是“莫洛托夫鸡尾酒”随成为燃烧瓶(土制汽油弹)最有名的别称。
参考文献
- Tomas Ries, Cold Will - The Defense of Finland, 1988, ISBN 0-08-033592-6, Potomac Books
- Ohto Manninen, Talvisodan salatut taustat, 1994, ISBN 951-9052-51-0, Kirjaneuvos, using declassified Soviet archive material, Manninen found 12 previously unrecognized infantry divisions ordered to Finnish front
- a b G.F. Krivosheev, Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, 1997, ISBN 1-85367-280-7, Greenhill Books
- Russo-Finnish War. Encarta. Retrieved on 2006-07-11.
- Laaksonen, Lasse, Todellisuus ja harhat, 2005, ISBN 951-20-6911-3, Gummerus
- Wolf H. Halsti, Talvisota 1939-1940, 1955, Otava
- Paasikivi, J.K., Toimintani Moskovassa, 1959, WSOY
- C. Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland 1939–40, 1997, London: Frank Cass
- Rentola, Kimmo, Residenttimme ilmoittaa..., Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 2002
- A.E.Taras, Soviet-Finland 1939-1940 war, Minsk, 1999.
- Winter War Website, [1]
- Karjala-lehti and MC-Info Oy 2005 (36 % vs. 52 %), Karjalan Liitto and Taloustutkimus 5.- 7.4. 2005 (26 % vs. 57 %)[2], HS-Gallup: Selvä enemmistö ei halua Karjalaa takaisin 21.8.2005 (30 % vs. 62 %)[3], STT / Suomen Gallup 2.7. 2004 (38 % vs. 57 %)
2 条评论:
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